lie virtue, as if a reduction in corporaternand marginal tax rates could restorernthe work ethic and the integrity of thernfamily. Despite this linkage, Gray notes,rnaltered fiscal policies effected no importantrnchange in the moral climate ofrneither Great Britain or the United States;rnthose social goods the New Right attributedrnto capital accumulation andrnlower taxes stemmed rather from culturalrnand religious attitudes. One cannotrnrecreate those attitudes, Gray insists,rnsimply by putting a different spin on therneconomy.rnIt was the social morality, abetted byrnpreexistent material conditions, of lowchurchrnProtestants that provided the majorrnbreakthrough in the British IndustrialrnRevolution. But the Protestant spiritrnof individuality that contributed to arnlawful society, as well as to economicrngrowth, in 19th-century England will notrnlikely be brought back by reprivatizingrnEnglish industries or by lowering corporaterntaxes. The cultural and social contextrnis no longer there; nor will the administrativernstate that has consolidatedrnits power in the present century go away.rnIndeed, Gray argues, the modern welfarernstate no longer controls even itself,rnhaving been invaded by the “neofeudalites”rnlong sponsored by that state.rnGivil service and public educationrnunions have mobilized “victimized” minorities,rnand corporate lobbyists have occupiedrnand colonized the still widelyrnpraised “democratic welfare state”; togetherrnthey have created the “newrnHobbesian dilemma,” an anti-sovereignrnstate that has become the battlefieldrnin the war of all against all. UnlikernHobbes’s Leviathan, which monopolizesrnviolence for the sake of ending civil strife,rnthe government described by Gray hasrnneither stability nor authority: it is thernstate of nature misrepresented by itsrnoccupants as the pacification of strife.rnBut as long as powerful interests, somernprotected by the national media, canrnbenefit from using the state apparatus,rnthey will continue to do so; and they willrnsilence their opposition by applying arncoercive administration against thosernthey marginalize.rnGray maintains that we must take thisrnhistorical situation for granted. For example,rnwe cannot hope to return to thernpre-welfare state, though it may be possiblernto fix, as Gray seeks to do, thosernfunctions the national government canrneffectively perform without being overlyrnintrusive. Gray, moreover, believes thatrnone can no longer halt multiculturalismrnin Great Britain, in view of the ThirdrnWorld immigration that has alreadyrntaken place there. What a reformedrnwelfare state might try to do, however, isrnsupport and nurture “real pluralism,”rni.e., the cultural life of transplantedrnThird World communities residing in itsrncountry; and while Gray shows unseemlyrnenthusiasm for the cultural transformationrnof the old Protestant Englandrnthat he obviously admires, his point neverthelessrndeserves attention. Perhaps inrnlight of recent developments, there mayrnno longer be a reasonable course for conservativesrnto follow, except to shore uprnthe Third Worid communities in theirrnmidst. Erom a conservative perspective,rnit may be better to help Indian immigrantsrnretain certain aspects of Hindurnvillage life than to surrender them tornfeminist reeducators.rnThere arc nonetheless two problemsrnwith Gray’s position. One, he surrendersrntoo much to the “given” historical situation,rnwhich it is possible to oppose evenrnwhile recognizing. If the welfare state isrnindeed as oppressive and unjust as Grayrnasserts, how can its leaders be expectedrnto adopt his suggested reforms? And ifrnthe “conservative” administrations ofrnReagan and Thatcher made so littlernheadway against “big government,” whyrnshould their governments bow to Gray’srnmerely literary opposition? Certainlyrnthey have no interest in restoring familiesrnand upholding communities, as opposedrnto isolating individuals and redefiningrnsocial identities. (Gray’s proposed reformsrnremind one of the wistful lamentrn”If only Hitler had been nice to thernJews!”) Gray describes the Americanrnand British welfare states in even morerncaustic terms than do libertarians such asrnLew Rockwell and Murray Rothbard, butrnthen he turns around to suggest how thernregimes might reform themselves in severalrnsteps.rnTwo, if culture really does drive politicsrnand economies, as Gray intimates,rnwhat hope is there of restoring freedomrnin the multicultural states of Englandrnand America? It seems that multinationals,rnthe managerial state, and publicrnpolicy foundations have profoundly affectedrnAmerican culture and morality.rnThey have certainly influenced our socialrnattitudes, patterns of community, andrnsense of national purpose. Yet, if Gray isrnright—and I believe that he is at leastrnpartly correct—can English libertiesrnflourish again among Hindus and Muslims,rneven among the members of thoserngroups who have become British subjects?rnGray rightly notes the historicalrnmoment at which liberal bourgeois societiesrndeveloped, mostly in the ProtestantrnWest. More than other classical liberalsrnof my acquaintance, he is aware ofrnthe historicity of the liberal heritage.rnGiven the particular circumstances inrnwhich that heritage arose, he is properlyrncontemptuous of the fiscal cure-alls byrnwhich the New Right seeks to resurrectrnit. (It is also possible, as he speculates,rnthat the managerial state is itself the creatorrnof some political liberty.) From itsrntolerance of administrative manipulation,rnone may conclude that our populationrnhas become hopelessly servile.rnYet, do we improve the prospects of ourrnown liberation by encouraging statesponsoredrncultural pluralism? Will thernfurther colonization of the West bring usrnback to something resembling Whiggishrnliberty—or will it take us evenrnfarther away from that goal?rnPaul Gottfried is a professor ofrnhumanities at Elizabethtown Collegernin Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.rnThe People at Warrnby William R. HawkinsrnA Democracy at War: America’s Fightrnat Home and Abroad in World War IIrnby William L. O’NeillrnNew York: Free Press;rn480 pp., $24.95rn^^^ he wars of peoples will be morernX terrible than the wars of kings!”rnSo predicted the young WinstonrnGhurchill as the new century dawned inrn1901. The world wars (two hot, onerncold) that have marked the decades sincernhave validated Ghurchill while contradictingrnthe glib predictions that “globalrndemocracy” would bring a new centuryrnof world peace.rnThis is not just a recent development.rnAn enormous amount of social energyrnwas unleashed during the rise of the nation-rnstate, an energy that had carriedrnWestern civilization to its apex duringrnChurchill’s early days as an imperialistadventurer.rnRegardless of whether arn34/CHRONICLESrnrnrn