The Chechen Boyeviki (“warriors”) are widening the war with Russia, dashing any hopes the Kremlin had of containing the conflict. On May 10, a group of 30 to 40 boyeviki practically wiped out an Internal Troops (MVD) convoy (killing 22 of 26 men) in the neighboring Ingush republic, embarrassing Moscow and sparking a war of words between the Russian military and Ingush President Ruslan Aushev, each blaming the other for the incident. Aushev claimed that the surprise attack was yet another indicator of the Russian military’s incompetence, since it came just a few kilometers from the Chechen border and the convoy did not take even elementary security precautions. The military fired back by questioning Aushev’s loyalty (the Ingush and Chechens are related peoples), inadvertently pointing out what most Russians already know: The Caucasian, mostly Muslim, republics sympathize with the Chechens and want Moscow to talk peace with Chechen President Asian Maskhadov.

In fact, Duma deputy Pavel Krashennikov—probably with the Kremlin’s blessing—had recently met with Maskhadov’s representative in Ingushetia, leading some pundits to conclude that both Maskhadov and President Vladimir Putin were ready to negotiate and that somebody, most likely the more belligerent Chechen “field commanders,” wanted to undercut peace talks. It is entirely possible, however, that hawks in the Russian military, warned by Russian intelligence for weeks of upcoming Chechen efforts to widen the war, deliberately kept their guard down, hoping for an attack.

Gennadi Troshev, Russia’s commander of ground forces in Chechnya, has more than once declared that any talks with the Chechens would be “treason.” Meanwhile, the military has been cashing in on its support for Putin during the recent presidential election: A slew of officers from the entourage of Troshev and Caucasian Military District commander Kazantsev have secured appointments to elite units serving in the Moscow Military District (MMD). In short, Putin is now surrounded by Chechen generals who could play a pivotal role in deciding the fate of Yeltsin’s successor if the Kremlin does something they don’t like—such as opening peace negotiations with the Chechens. Putin’s mentor, Boris Yeltsin, stripped the army of men and equipment, weakened the MMD, transferred resources to the MVD, and boosted the elite Airborne Forces as his unofficial presidential guard. (Yeltsin was not known as a political survivor for nothing.) But Putin has transferred command of MVD units in the Caucasus to an army general and has not kept up the flow of extra pay and generous perks to the Airborne Forces.

Meanwhile, army commanders are increasingly insubordinate, rumors are mounting of a Bin Laden-brokered Islamist offensive in both the Caucasus and Central Asia this summer, and the Russian media are reporting airstrikes against rebel positions inside Ingushetia. What will happen next is anybody’s guess, but one thing is clear: Putin, propelled into the presidency by both the oligarchs and the military/security apparatus, is not entirely in control of the Kremlin.