of its industrial machinery and infrastructure as he could, seizingrnentire plants and shipping them to the East, where thevrnrusted on railroad sidings.rnThe second defeat of Germany in less than three decades,rnand the emergence of an expansionist and imperialistrnSoviet Union, did not destroy the Bismarckian hopes for arnmerger of German technology and industrial capacity withrnSoviet resources, manpower, and markets. On the Soviet side,rnright up to and through Gorbachev’s tenure, Kremlin policyrnwas directed toward separating Germany from NATO, bringingrnit back together with Russia, accelerating the growth of trade,rnand renewing strategic ties—policies that are emerging again asrnPresident Yeltsin bows to the nationalist-communist coalition.rnGermany not only reciprocated by encouraging these movesrnbut actively collaborated, holding itself up to the West as thernone country in Europe ready to invest in the Kremlin bothrnpolitically and economically. It was as much a matter ofrnnational policy as it was a money-making ploy that the FederalrnRepublic joined in arming the Kremlin’s Arab clients andrnsupplying them with needed parts and technology for nuclearrnmilitary capabilities, thus adding to the anti-Western imbalancernin the Middle East. West Germany, despite its lip-servicernto NATO and a European union and its dependence onrnUnited States power to restrain Eastern bloc adventurism, wasrnclearly reluctant to join American and British efforts against thern”Evil Empire.”rnIt was Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats who firstrnopenly espoused an Ostpolitik redolent of Rapallo and thernSeeckt program, but the Christian Democrats were not far behind.rnGermany today is quietly having second thoughts aboutrnEuropean union, but it has acted more vigorously than any ofrnits “allies,” despite the economic difficulties attending its unificationrnwith East Germany, to give significant aid and guidancernto Russia. Germany has been the most active and thernmost effective in moving in on a turbulent Russia seeking direction.rnAnd for a reason. Germany must move east if, in thernface of an aggressive Japanese economy and the reformation ofrnworid trade, it is to maintain its industrial power. Eor Germany,rnthe establishment of a power bloc it could lead, includingrnRussia and some of the remnants of the old Austro-HungarianrnEmpire, makes greater political and economic sense than to remainrnwithin a Western European conglomerate with which itrnhas been at overt and covert political, economic, and sometimesrnmilitary war for most of modern history. The kind of “alliance”rntoward which the two countries have historically,rnthough spasmodically, moved would not only create an economicrnand power bloc astride Eurasia from the Rhine to the Pacificrnbut would give Germany a finger on the nuclear trigger.rnToday’s Germany is not the Prussia of old. Nor can it employrnan Austro-Hungarian formula not viable since the end ofrnWorld War I. The Austro-Hungarian emperors could happilyrnassent to the adage: Alii bella gerent; tu, felix Austria, nube.rn”Let others wage war; you, happy Austria, marry.” The oldrndynasties—political or economic—are gone, and a modernrnGermany has learned that trade and industrial might are a betterrnmeans of achieving hegemony than war and royal ties. Sornone umbrella covering a unified Germany and much of thernRussian land mass need not raise specters of an Orwellianrnfuture. But it is nevertheless true that the world is moving inrnold ways to new destinations. What we are seeing is the formationrnof new economic coalitions of great significance. Withrna Germany seeking a Bismarckian destiny to the East, thernworld may well face an economic concentration that will shiftrnthe balance of power and create a “New World Order” that willrnhardly be to America’s liking or advantage and will make itsrnproblems with Japan seem minuscule in comparison.rnProphecy is a dangerous occupation, and though historyrndoes not repeat itself, it is frequently given to plagiarism. If thernpast is prelude, the future may, mutatis mutandis, be a functionrnof what has been—with Worid War II, the Cold War, and thernRusso-German symbiosis revealing themselves as a continuum.rnNo policy for the United Sates, or NATO for that matter, canrnmake sense if this is ignored. It is true that generals prepare forrnthe previous war and statesmen for eariier historical formulations.rnBut to ignore the past is to compromise the future. Inrnthe next 100 years, the lion will not lie with the lamb nor thernlamb with the coyote. And history will move as it always has—rnan ebb and flow that dates back to the time when the Egyptiansrnbelieved that their future was as certain as the overflow of thernNile. Their error lived on through Assyria, Babylonia, Greece,rnRome, and the British Empire. That is no reason for adding tornthe list the first and greatest republic in the modern world.rnSongrnby Peter RussellrnA garden without weedsrnA city with no slumsrnA fruit with no seedsrnA cracker with no crumbsrnSanskrit without tearsrnA bee without a stingrnChildbirth without fearsrnEars that never singrnA mathematics with no sumsrnA heart that never bleeds—rnMay the rose without a thornrnNever on earth be bornrn22/CHRONICLESrnrnrn