but skillful manipulation (as the Israeli analyst Yohanan Ramatirnhas pointed out) by Croatian and Muslim propaganda of holocaustrnthemes to mobilize American Jewish opinion, and the desirernof some Israeli policymakers to be in accord with Americanrnsupport for friendly, pro-Western Islamic states. Summing uprnthis orientation in the New York Times (January 2, 1996), in anrnop-ed with the revealing title of “The Third American Empire,”rnJacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind, both editors at thernNew Republic, wrote:rnThe fact that the United States is more enthusiastic thanrnits European allies about a Bosnian Muslim state reflects,rnamong other things, the new American role as the leaderrnof an informal collection of Muslim nations from thernPersian Gulf to the Balkans. The regions once mled byrnthe Ottoman Turks show signs of becoming the heart ofrnThe Machinernby Richard MoorernDictator? You’d abort him?rnOffend those who support him?rnThe rich, accepting offers,rnbenefit, fill his coffers,rnliking the gourmet winesrnbought with their wells and mines,rnlaborers free to hidernin plundered countryside . . .rnHe’s found The Golden Fleece.rnIt arms, pays his policernand keeps haters and hatedrnterrorized, lubricated.rnThe Nations with a frownrncry, Naughty! Pull him down!—rnwould take apart and cleanrnthat beautiful machinernthey helped him build: their hollersrnget them more oil, more dollars.rnSome spoilsport gmnts and kicks it.rnIf it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.rna third American empire.rnPerhaps partly a function of historical and geographic illiteracy,rnmost American policymakers seem to have trouble with thernnotion of a world characterized by several competing powers,rnsimilar in many respects to that of pre-1914, though today thernpowers are mostly non-European. Additionally, there is a heavyrnelement of inertia, particularly among those associated withrnthe defense establishment: postcommunist Russia may not bernthe Soviet Union, but it is the best we can come up with.rnAwareness that the Cold War was itself the latest unfortunaterninstallment of the fratricidal intra-Christian, intra-Europeanrnself-immolation (which, with the toll of both world wars and internalrnrepression by totalitarianism, has cost us tens of millionsrnof the best people our civilization has produced) is almostrnnonexistent; on the contrary, the thrust of American policy isrnnot to unify Europe but to set it at daggers against itself yetrnagain.rnAs a mle, each country in Europe feels entitled to look downrnits nose on its immediate neighbor to the east. Several countries,rnnotably Russia, Poland, Germany, and Croatia, like to flatterrnthemselves with the notion that they are Europe’s easternrnbulwark against the Asiatic hordes. The Poles consider the Russiansrnbarbarians, the Germans believe they are superior to allrnSlavs, the French see Germans as the uncouth Hun, and, inrnBritish eyes, the wogs begin at Calais. In America, this phenomenonrnmanifests itself in the vague notion that the “West”rnis synonymous with a host of Goodthink concepts (enlightenment,rnprogress, democracy, etc.) and the “East” with their antitheses.rnAn important reinforcement of this notion was thernsupposition, during the Cold War, that communism was somehowrnmore natural to Eastern Europeans (i.e., “Bohunks”) thanrnit is to people that are more like us. There is also an identifiablernbias among American elites, particularly in the media, againstrnnational cultures based on Eastern Orthodox Christianity andrnperhaps against Orthodoxy itself. The upshot is that in thernconflicts that define the line between the European and non-rnEuropean world—notably in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, andrnin Central Asia, where Orthodox nations are in conflict with Islamrn—the hegemonist elite is almost uniformly hostile to thernChristian, European side. NATO expansion up to Europe’srnEastAVest fault line, with Orthodox countries excluded, shouldrnbe seen in the same light.rnAs both Alain Besangon {The Rise of the Gulag: IntellectualrnOrigins of Leninism) and Igor Shafarevich {The SocialistrnPhenomenon) have shown, among the characteristic features ofrnmodern ideologies, of socialism in particular, is a completelyrnclosed, circular system of thought. Indeed, it might be morerncorrect to refer to a nullihcation of thought, an antidote to rationalrndiscourse and description of social and political phenomena.rnWhat appeared instead was epitomized by Marxism-rnLeninism, a dualistic pseudo-reality where words and conceptsrnare given a special ideological significance distinct from theirrnnormal real-world meanings and which insists that the realrnworld conform to the ideological vision. Ideology does not appearrnfully mature, like Athena springing from the forehead ofrnZeus, but rather, as Besangon observed, becomes apparentrnwhenrnit has attained its pure, developed form, [having] gonernthrough a historical cycle. The history of ideology couldrn30/CHRONICLESrnrnrn