All prudent consumers are supposed to be guided by the warning embodied in the ancient Latin expression Caveat emptor (“Let the buyer beware”).  A contemporary geopolitical modification of that expression should be borne in mind by Americans as the United States more vigorously embraces the legitimacy of preemptive military attacks against adversaries who may attack the United States—namely, Caveat preemptor.

U.S. national security strategy has always embodied a blend of defensive and offensive capabilities, following the wisdom that “the best defense is a good offense.”  In this context, the decision of the Bush administration after September 11 to engage in some preemptive attacks is in keeping with that tradition.

An emphasis on preemption is akin to periodic reminders by administration officials that the United States may exercise the option of using nuclear weapons.  Most recently, this approach has been evident in hints that the United States might use all available weapons against adversaries who might be tempted to use their “weapons of mass destruction” against the United States.  The risk inherent in this approach is that—like nuclear escalation during the Cold War—use of a preemptive option could get out of control if terrorists or rogue states decide to call our bluff.

The concept of preemption affirmed by President Bush in his June 2002 speech at West Point and in his subsequent National Security Strategy is different, however, because it more openly stresses the United States’ prerogative to undertake preemptive military actions against perceived threats while backing way from our established reliance on strategic deterrence.  Clearly, this is a significant shift in U.S. security priorities.

What is to prevent other countries from following the United States’ example in waging preemptive wars against perceived threats?  Were U.S. allies to emulate this principle, what would prevent one of them from launching a unilateral preemptive military strike of her own?  Would such an action obligate the United States to stand by her ally?  If the answer is yes, then we had better reappraise the nature of U.S. alliances and how their geopolitical contexts could entangle us in wars that are not of our choosing.  If the answer is no, then why should those allies be expected to stand by the United States in the context of any preemptive American attack against a perceived enemy?

In either case, it is in the national interest of the United States and disparate friends and allies to clarify in advance each side’s obligations.  Such clarifications should be spelled out in all the security treaties and executive agreements that form the basis of our strategic ties worldwide.  We could forge agreements with our allies to guarantee advanced consultation before any security partner would take preemptive military action.  Or we could secure the sole prerogative to take preemptive military actions—without obligating our friends and allies to support them.  Or any ally could pursue military preemptive action on her own initiative, on the understanding that there would be no obligation for the other security partners to support it.

Dealing with existing or potential adversaries is far more daunting.  What is to stop our adversaries from copying the United States in a hostile manner?  If such countries—especially members of the “Axis of Evil”—are confident that the United States is fully prepared and willing to launch a preemptive war on one or more of them, why would they avoid contemplating what could be labeled “preemptive preemption?”

North Korea’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine was far more ominous than Sad-dam Hussein’s.  In several respects, North Korea is a much more formidable adversary than Iraq.  With North Korea’s enormous military establishment equipped with an array of offensive weapons and noted for its fanaticism, no one visualizes regime change in Pyongyang as a low-risk endeavor.  Although her economy is a mess, North Korea’s military does not share the liabilities more evident in Iraq’s military.  Moreover, North Korea has a track record of engaging in a provocative strategy that seeks to push the United States to the cusp of war.  Thus, when the Bush administration adopted a tougher policy toward North Korea, labeled her part of the Axis of Evil, and implied that she might warrant preemptive military treatment, the North Koreans launched a new round of nuclear brinkmanship.  In effect, Pyongyang has tried to up the ante vis-à-vis the United States, by taking advantage of the geopolitical strains inherent in a multiple-war scenario for U.S. strategists and adopting the Bush Doctrine for its own purposes.  As North Korean Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Ri Pyonggap observed, “The United States says that after Iraq, we are next, but we have our own countermeasures.  Preemptive attacks are not the exclusive right of the U.S.” (quoted in Jonathan Watts, “N. Korea Threatens US With First Strike,” the Guardian, February 6, 2003).  The plausibility of such threats is open to debate, but there is no question that North Korea seems to be willing to experiment with the option of preemptive preemption.

It does not take much imagination to visualize the risks this convoluted psycho-logy could unleash.  Instead of prevent-ing war scenarios—as mutual deterrence is intended to do—mutual preemptive strategies could escalate the prospects for armed conflicts.  The United States may be able to utilize effectively a preemptive strike against the first perceived adversary she chooses to deal with, but all the others waiting in the wings would henceforth possess major incentives to try to preempt the U.S. preemptor.  North Korea seems to be at the head of the line of states willing to follow through on those incentives.

However, it is important to note that—for all her sinister qualities—North Korea remains a territorial state with attendant geopolitical vulnerabilities.  Moreover, both North and South Korea share ambitions to reunify their nation into a single state.  Therefore, there may be far greater dangers posed by an array of violently radical nonstate actors who do not have much to lose.  When dealing with terrorists or their supporters, there are few deterrents for the United States to use other than threats of preemptive strikes designed to destroy their organizational infrastructure and transnational support network.  Unfortunately, unlike during the Cold War, there is little to inhibit today’s terrorist adversaries from turning the tables on the United States.  These terrorists perceive their brand of preemption as more effective than anything the United States can inflict on them.  Preemptive armed attacks on the United States or her interests abroad can be psychologically effective in exerting pressure on American society to get the U.S. government to alter its policies.  Consequently, these dynamics pose great risks, as the United States and nonstate terrorist groups try to outmaneuver one another.

Before the United States goes too far down the path to strategic preemption, Americans had better contemplate what it may be like if we find ourselves either caught up in, or on the receiving end of, other countries’ or terrorist groups’ emulation of the Bush Doctrine.  Our adversaries have ample reason to consider preemptive preemption.  This does not mean that we should forego preemption as a last resort, but it does mean that the United States should not stray too far from her established strategic principles of deterrence.  The primary forms of U.S. preemption should remain diplomatic and economic.  Excessive emphasis—real or rhetorical—on military preemption would not necessarily enhance U.S. national security and could expose the United States to being entangled in perpetual war.  Furthermore, the emphasis on preemption as a key part of U.S. strategic policy unwisely suggests a hegemonic empire bent on overturning challenges to far-flung outposts.  It is far sounder for the United States to focus on a strategic policy appropriate for a republic defending itself against threats to its territorial security.  Given these parameters, Caveat preemptor, indeed.