Ukraine’s sudden incursion into the Russian territory near Kursk, which started on Aug. 6, was the most noteworthy event in the Ukrainian theater of operations this summer. Limited in geographic scope (affecting less than 500 square miles) and the number of troops involved (up to 10,000), it was a bold tactical move intended to have a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. Kursk was the site of the greatest tank battle of all time, in the summer of 1943, and its symbolic significance to many Russians is second only to Stalingrad’s.

The Ukrainian operation had a threefold purpose. It was calculated to stifle foreign voices that have warned of a stalemate and called for negotiations, which would likely involve some territorial concessions to Russia; to bolster morale at home, which reportedly has been wavering of late; and to embarrass Putin and perhaps undermine his domestic support.

In addition, the Ukraine Foreign Ministry has said the operation was not about holding territory but stopping long-range missile strikes by Russia into Ukraine from the Kursk; this seems to have been, at best, a secondary objective.

The plan appears to have worked, up to a point. India’s prime minister Narendra Modi arrived in Kiev on Aug. 23, having announced just days earlier that India was prepared to contribute to resolving the conflict. He did not make any progress with Zelensky, however; the hosts’ mood seemed buoyant. India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar later said the path to peace was “clearly a complex issue,” and that India believed Moscow should be involved if peace efforts were to progress. That is resolutely rejected both by Ukraine and by its Western sponsors.

Also on Aug. 23, and probably not by mere coincidence, the U.S. announced it was sending a new package of military aid worth $125 million. This is not much compared to the $55 billion-plus delivered thus far, but it symbolizes continued U.S. commitment to the open-ended war even as the presidential race enters its final stage. The weapons, mostly of an offensive kind (like HIMARS), are being provided through presidential drawdown authority, which means they are taken from Pentagon stockpiles and can be delivered almost immediately.

The upbeat mood in Kiev may not last long, however. The Ukrainian attack on the Kursk region has not dented Russia’s overall strategic advantage. It is certainly not a “turning point” in the war, as occasionally claimed by some of Kiev’s more zealous advocates. What is it, then?

Andrew Latham, a strongly pro-Ukrainian academic and defense analyst, believes that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive is a “huge strategic error.” This “reckless gambit” in his opinion “diverts critical resources from the primary battlefield while offering negligible strategic gain”:

While the incursion has captured headlines and inflicted some measure of psychological damage on Russia, such superficial victories do little to alter the fundamental dynamics of the conflict… Ukraine finds itself embroiled in a costly and ultimately futile endeavor. While the world watches in fascination, the real battle for Ukraine’s future continues to unfold elsewhere. Zelensky’s decision to gamble on a high-stakes publicity stunt is a tragic misjudgment that may have far-reaching consequences.

To squander precious resources on a symbolic gesture is a luxury the country cannot afford, Latham concludes. It is time to return to the core mission, retaking lost territory; the incursion into Russia is a step in the wrong direction.

An online symposium, posted by Responsible Statecraft on Aug. 15, provided several interesting insights, some of them at odds with the Beltway groupthink.

Jasen J. Castillo, co-director of Albritton Center for Grand Strategy at Texas A&M University, is concerned that in the longer term, Ukraine—which is facing dangerous shortfalls in manpower and equipment—will deplete elite units that would have been needed elsewhere: “Ukraine’s attack reminds me of Germany’s audacious Western offensive in 1944 that surprised the Allies, made gains, and ended with a defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, which then wasted manpower and equipment it needed months later on the Eastern Front.”

Ivan Eland, director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty, wondered about the real purpose of the incursion. It may have been designed to shock Russian leader Vladimir Putin about Russia’s vulnerability, he wrote, but prior raids or attacks on Russia and Crimea have already demonstrated that. “Conducting offensive operations is usually much more costly in personnel and equipment than being on defense,” he noted, “so is it worth it for Ukraine to divert forces from already thin defense lines to go on a risky offensive with only nebulous benefits?” Because Russia outnumbers and outguns Ukraine, Eland concludes, it may not need to denude its attack forces in Ukraine to defend Russian territory.

Mark Episkopos, Eurasia research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, agreed: “Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine’s Donbas region.”

John Mearsheimer, the doyen of the realist school of world affairs at the University of Chicago,also believes that Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk was a strategic blunder which will accelerate its defeat:

The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia:  To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine—where they are desperately needed—and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia’s favor. It is no wonder—given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is—that the Russians were caught by surprise.

Mearsheimer’s fellow realist Stephen Walt is equally adamant that the Ukrainian incursion will not affect the outcome of the war: “Ukraine’s fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.”

In the third week of the Kursk incursion, the question remains when and how this key determination will be made—and what will happen to Ukraine once the war does end. At the beginning of 2014, before the February coup in Kiev, the country extended over 232,000  square miles and had a population of 40 million. Today, without Crimea and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, it has lost a fifth of its territory and likely at least a third of its population. The task of reconstruction will cost unknown hundreds of billions, which will require a massive multilateral effort.

It should be accepted in the “collective West” that this war will not end in Russia’s defeat, and that Ukraine can and should be a neutral buffer zone—perhaps as part of the EU one day,  but never as a NATO member. That is a reasonable solution, a viable plus-sum-game for all concerned. Willfully postponing its acceptance is not only irrational, it is criminal. That is the broad picture; the Kursk intrusion is but a footnote.