It is reasonable to assume that a country’s foreign policy is conducted in the interest of that country’s security and well-being and that those entrusted with its formulation and conduct will act in a coherent and rational manner.  At the end of 2003, the foreign policy of the United States was neither coherent nor rational.  There was no unity of purpose or of action.  This is illustrated by a sequence of strange events in the space of one week last December.

On December 6, the Associated Press reported that “President Bush and his top aides were cajoling, imploring and even sweet-talking allies” into sharing the burden of reconstructing Iraq with America.  In a reversal of previous policy, Washington declared that it wanted greater roles in Iraq for the United Nations and NATO.  Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were sent to Europe with a new, less confrontational message, initially delivered by President Bush in London just before Thanksgiving, that both the reconstruction of Iraq and the War on Terror demand allies and partnerships.

Mr. Rumsfeld was anything but his usual abrasive self when he met NATO defense ministers in Brussels (December 2) and declared that Washington “welcomes more help in Iraq.”  When he went on to declare that “maybe we ought to try to do a better job of communicating,” his audience could hardly believe this was the same man who had been so dismissive of “Old Europe” a year ago.

Only days later, addressing his NATO colleagues in Brussels, Mr. Powell urged the alliance “to examine how it might do more to support peace and stability in Iraq, which every leader has acknowledged is critical to us.”  NATO foreign ministers did not exactly embrace the idea, but they left the door open for such a possibility, if a suitable political framework could be agreed upon.

As the New York Times commented in the aftermath of the Rumsfeld/Powell tour, “there is a universal recognition among NATO members that the rift both within the Atlantic alliance and between Europe and the US has to be repaired if the alliance is to remain viable.”  The new mood went so far that President Jacques Chirac, the most outspoken European opponent of the war in Iraq, started talking of a more active French role in NATO and even in Iraq.  His officials hinted that France had not discarded a contingency plan to send 8,000 to 10,000  soldiers to Iraq if the political structure was right.

Then came the bombshell.  On December 9, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz released a memorandum (dated December 5) announcing that countries that had opposed the Iraq war would be barred by the United States from bidding on billions of dollars of reconstruction contracts, ranging from equipping the new Iraqi army to rebuilding power and water plants, roads, oil installations, and communications systems.  Those contracts would only be given to companies from the United States and her coalition partners, Wolfowitz said.  In a sentence laden with cynicism yet masterfully Marxist in its dialectics, he declared that “limiting competition for prime contracts will encourage the expansion of international cooperation in Iraq and in future efforts” and that “every effort must be made to expand international cooperation in Iraq.”

Wolfowitz’s statement was the diplomatic equivalent of a barrel of gasoline being thrown onto an almost extinguished fire.  “We noted this news with amazement,” German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said.  Canada’s incoming Prime Minister Paul Martin found it “very difficult to understand” why such a statement would be made.  “This is a gratuitous and extremely unhelpful decision,” declared Chris Patten, the E.U. commissioner for international relations.

The announcement came on the eve of a major U.S. initiative led by former secretary of state James A. Baker III to reduce Iraq’s foreign debt of over $120 billion, much of it owed to France, Germany, and Russia.  Mr. Baker’s European tour nevertheless went ahead as scheduled, and the Europeans proved surprisingly accommodating to his request that they lessen Iraq’s debt burdens.  France’s and Germany’s cooperative posture was an explicit nod to the Baker camp within the Republican Party, a pointed gesture of support to the old GOP establishment.  As a British commentator noted, “[T]hey were helping Baker in spite of Wolfowitz; they were investing into the next Administration’s internal balance of forces, which is more important than some elusive Iraqi contracts.”

The timing of Wolfowitz’s December 9 announcement was embarrassing for President Bush personally, since he had scheduled telephone conversations with Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and Russian President Vladimir Putin for the following day to discuss debt cancellation.  Instead of pressing his interlocutors for concessions, he was subjected to their cold questioning about the Pentagon announcement.  It seems inconceivable that Wolfowitz was unaware of the arrangement at the time of his announcement.

In the aftermath of the apparent faux pas, most foreign commentators accused Mr. Bush of insensitivity and arrogance, while most domestic commentators complained of his ineptitude.  The New York Times set the tone by declaring that “President Bush has reversed field again and left the European allies angry, the secretary of state looking out of step, and the rest of us wondering exactly what his policy really is.”

It is remarkable that Wolfowitz himself was not included among those deserving reproach.  The implied assumption is that the assistant secretary of defense was simply acting as a loyal official carrying out his assigned tasks and that the President was to blame for an impression of illogicality and incoherence in his team’s policy.  Unnamed White House sources revealed that the President was “distinctly unhappy” about the whole affair, but—whatever his true feelings—Mr. Bush defended Wolfowitz’s announcement.  Colin Powell remained silent, however; a top State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, reflected his boss’s feelings when he called the whole episode “a train wreck.”

Why did Paul Wolfowitz—an experienced, skillful, and highly intelligent operator—choose such an unhappy moment to make the announcement, and why did he adopt such a gratuitously insulting tone?  At the technical level, why was a memo written on December 5 released exactly four, and not ten or twelve, days later, which would have given Bush and Baker an opportunity to launch the campaign for debt reduction without immediate hindrance?  At the policy level, why was Wolfowitz allowed to impose the exclusion order in the first place—it is clear that the December 9 memo was his and that Bush approved it against the better judgment of Powell and others—when it was so diametrically opposed to the thrust of the administration’s policy in previous weeks?

Wolfowitz is guilty neither of ineptitude nor of incoherence.  Over the past three years, his every statement and move has proved that he is highly rational and coherent in pursuit of his objectives.  The problem is that those objectives are not the stated goals of the Bush administration as a whole.

Far from seeking cooperation and partnership, Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives want to create a permanent rift between the United States and Europe.  His famous Vanity Fair admission last spring—that in seeking justification for war against Iraq “for bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on”—likewise caused furor in Europe.  It made a mockery of Powell’s claim that Iraq was being attacked because she had violated her “international obligations” under the 1991 surrender agreement, which required the disclosure and removal of Iraq’s WMD’s.  Just like his December 9 announcement, Wolfowitz’s Vanity Fair admission was prima facie irrational and at odds with the Bush administration’s stated policy objectives.  In both cases, a wrench was thrown into the work of “rebuilding Iraq” through international consensus and cooperation.

Wolfowitz’s behavior is coherent and logical only if his true objective is to make sure that the United States remains the only outside power that matters in the Middle East.  Since he is neither mad nor stupid, his December 9 announcement should be seen as a deliberate move to preempt and torpedo Bush’s, Baker’s, and Powell’s initiative to get Europe, NATO, and the United Nations involved in Iraq.  Wolfowitz and his neoconservative allies do not want any foreign involvement there, except on their terms and under their control.  They want the United States to remain engaged on her own, with all key decisions made by themselves, not through some multilateral mechanism that would be imposed if NATO were to send troops and Europe were to forgive debts.  Wolfowitz’s claim that “every effort must be made to expand international cooperation” is the exact opposite of his true intent, revealed in his hint that “future efforts” like the one in Iraq are planned.

If Bush proves insufficiently enthusiastic toward such efforts, some neoconservatives are hinting that they may ditch him and look for another political host organism.  On December 9, the Washington Post published an odd article called “How Dean Could Win,” by William Kristol, the editor of the Weekly Standard, which listed potential weaknesses Bush will face during the 2004 campaign.  Are not Bush’s response to September 11 and his overall leadership in the War on Terror compelling reasons to keep him in office? Kristol asks.  He proceeds to give an ambiguous answer: While Bush is committed to victory in that war, Colin Powell is committed to diplomatic compromise, and Donald Rumsfeld, “to an odd kind of muscle-flexing-disengagement”:

And when Bush’s chief of staff, Andrew H. Card Jr., said . . . with regard to Iraq, “We’re going to get out of there as quickly as we can, but not before we finish the mission at hand,” one wonders: . . . doesn’t the first half of that sentence suggest that even the most senior of Bush’s subordinates haven’t really internalized the president’s view of the fundamental character of this war?  If they haven’t, will the American people grasp the need for Bush’s continued leadership on November 2?  If not, prepare for President Dean.

There is only one way to read this bizarre paragraph: The administration had better lay off Israel, stay deep in Iraq, and authorize new “future efforts” (Syria? Iran?), or Kristol’s friends will back Dean.

That scenario is far from unthinkable: If the Democrats inherit Iraq, they may prove wonderfully appreciative of what Kristol calls the “fundamental character” of the war.  Ever since Woodrow Wilson, the notion of spreading democracy, building nations, and bringing human rights to the benighted foreign masses has been the Democrats’ specialty.  The preoccupation with making the Middle East safe for Our Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier has, historically, resonated more deeply with Dean’s party than with the GOP.

Kristol’s neoconservative friends have used Bush with skill over the past three years, but they still do not trust him.  They know that, before running for the presidency, he had no strong views about any foreign topic, the Middle East included, and they only trust people with strong views—their views.  Apparently, even Rumsfeld no longer pleases them, and targeting him, Powell, and Card may hint at the scope of their personnel ambitions for a second Bush term.

Wolfowitz’s premeditated blunder of December 9 should be seen in this context.  It had the additional objective of severing Bush’s remaining ties to those of his father’s friends and advisors who still hope to pull him away from the neocons.  In the final analysis, the neoconservatives may be more interested in discrediting Baker, Powell, and others than in running Iraq.  The Big Prize for them would be to isolate Bush from competing counsel so that they can completely control policy in the next administration.

Is George W. Bush aware of all of this, and is he willing—and able—to do something about it?  The answer will become clear if Wolfowitz remains Rumsfeld’s No. 2.  In a normal, well-ordered country, his actions last December—whether caused by malice, ineptitude, or stupidity—would be punished by immediate dismissal.  If he remains at his post, I fear that America is no longer a normal country.