Osama bin Laden’s death at the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs, announced on May 1, gives (theoretically, at least) Washington the opportunity to make an exit from Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it most certainly underscored the surreal nature of Washington’s relationship with its “ally” in the region.  Bin Laden was hiding in plain sight in a large, walled house just a stone’s throw away from Pakistan’s military academy.  The compound may have been built specifically for Bin Laden six years ago in a neighborhood full of retired Pakistani military officers, in a country that has benefited from billions in U.S. aid.  The inescapable conclusion is that the Pakistani military and security apparatus knew where Bin Laden was all along and had actively aided him in evading U.S. forces, all the while taking U.S. money and helping to prolong an American presence in the region that has cost thousands of lives.  According to news reports, the CIA tracked a Bin Laden courier who eventually led the intelligence agency to the house in an area with a number of Pakistani military installations.  The absurdity of bolstering a treacherous ally that hosted a sworn enemy in comfort while people were dying as the result of a fruitless manhunt seems lost on many of the Washington elite, who, celebrations over Bin Laden’s death notwithstanding, have never quite decided what the United States is supposed to be doing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Islamabad, on the other hand, seems to have a pretty clear idea of what it wants: to bilk Uncle Sam for as much as possible, while pursuing the strategic goal of blocking Indian influence in the region.

The killing of Bin Laden followed on the heels of steadily mounting tensions between the Islamabad and Washington.  The increased tensions followed the January arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis for killing two Pakistanis in Lahore.  (He was released in March.)  But the tensions were signs of a deeper rift that existed all along: Pakistan, her military and security apparatus chock full of Al Qaeda and Taliban sympathizers, knows full well that Washington will eventually withdraw from Afghanistan and has been preparing for what she sees as the inevitable return of Taliban rule.

The cynicism of the Pakistanis, and either the ignorance or cynicism of Washington officialdom, was on full display in April, when Pakistani intelligence (ISI) chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha met with CIA Director Leon Panetta and complained of civilian casualties resulting from CIA drone attacks.  (According to news accounts, the attacks killed 600 to 1,000 people last year.)  The ISI director pressed for more Pakistani control over CIA personnel and operations in his country.  While Bin Laden was living in ease, conceivably at American expense, the ISI was arguing against the attacks because they had killed not terrorist leaders but lower-level personnel.  Nevertheless, Panetta said that the drone attacks, though curtailed, would continue.  At the same time, the United States had complained of the Pakistani side being slow to take action of its own to deal with the Qaeda/Taliban presence on its territory because of ISI and military ties to the Taliban.

The rift over drone attacks followed the Davis affair, but the CIA believed the ISI and Pakistani military were manipulating popular outrage over the killings in Pakistan, and many on the U.S. side were deeply suspicious of the Pakistani intelligence apparatus.  Davis was reportedly providing security for U.S. operatives gathering intelligence on ISI support for terrorist groups when he shot two men he later said were trying to rob him.  At the time of the shootings, U.S. operatives in Lahore were tracking the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Righteous”) terrorist organization, the group responsible for the bloody attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008.  According to press reports, the ISI had aided the Mumbai terrorists since they had fought against its archenemy, India, in Kashmir.  Despite U.S. claims that the same terrorists were plotting attacks on Western targets, the ISI refused to sever its ties with the group.

The Pakistani intelligence/security apparatus has been very unhappy with the CIA’s interest in its ties to terrorist organizations and in the country’s nuclear program.  (U.S. intelligence is investigating Islamabad’s nuclear program, showing an obvious concern about Al Qaeda sympathizers in Pakistan passing nuclear material to the terrorists.)  Meanwhile, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, fearful of what may happen when the U.S. military departs, has been reportedly cooperating with Islamabad, forming a commission to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban, one in which the Pakistani side wants a formal role for its military, which is aiming to achieve Pakistan’s chief goal: an anti-Indian regime in Kabul.  Before the Bin Laden raid, Al Qaeda was reported to be reestablishing its presence in northeastern Afghanistan, while the Pakistani military was hinting it might cut off supply routes (as it has before) to Afghanistan to pressure the United States.

The obvious question in this mess, especially after the killing of Bin Laden, is just why the United States would remain involved.  Yet, according to the New York Times, Obama counterterrorism advisor John Brennan, perhaps to counter pressure to speed up a withdrawal from Afghanistan, is still calling Pakistan a “critical partner” in the “fight against terrorism” and speaking of a continued NATO presence in Afghanistan.  Nevertheless, the Times also reported that the Obama administration may be moving away from its former counterterrorism strategy and might support Karzai’s reconciliation with the Taliban.  Let’s hope that an exit is made sooner rather than later—and that Washington drops all support for, and pretense of, an alliance with Islamabad.