The French and the Dutch rejections of the proposed E.U. constitution by referenda (May 29 and June 1, respectively) shook the European neoliberal federation—though it was unwilling to concede defeat: The European Union’s Luxembourg presidency and the leaders of France and Germany immediately declared that the process of ratifying the charter should proceed in other countries, regardless of the verdict in those two key founding members.  German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said that he remains convinced of the need for the constitution: “[I]f we want a democratic, social-minded and strong Europe . . . there is no sound alternative.”  The E.U. “crisis summit” (June 16-17) was expected, at the time of this writing, to reassert the federalists’ faith in the project.

The Old Continent’s federalist elite is not giving up, but the reality was summed up by Italian Deputy Prime Minister Giulio Tremonti, who declared that “the European Constitution, as it has been presented and managed, is finished.”

It is finished indeed, and that news is good.  The 400-page E.U. constitution is a flawed document.  Had it been ratified, it would have paved the way for a bureaucratic superstate in which each member country’s sovereignty, individuality, and dignity would be violated and suppressed.

For instance, the constitution states that “The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives” (Article I).

Furthermore, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.  These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail” (Article I-10).

Moreover, “only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts” (Article I-12).

And, finally, “Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area” (Article I-16).

Admittedly, the motives of many French and Dutch “no” voters had little to do with the nature of the superstate project.  Many of them simply wanted to punish unpopular governments for lackluster economic performances.  It is nevertheless significant that the “yes” camp could not mount a credible countercampaign based on the argument that “Europe” should not be punished for the domestic shortcomings of President Chirac or Prime Minister Balkenende.

The federalists’ failure to capture the imagination of any significant socioeconomic segment, except for the managerial urban elite, is not surprising.  It reflects their arrogant belief that, in the end, the “right” decision will be pushed through regardless of hoi polloi.  They intend to repeat the blueprint of the Danish and Irish E.U. referenda: After each “no” vote, try again and again until you get a “yes”—which is for keeps.

This will not work.  In France, a tacit tactical alliance of the old left and the old right has been asserted for the first time since Petain.  In Holland, the issues of sovereignty, identity, and immigration were openly raised in the referendum debate, and the genie is now out of the bottle.  In what is arguably Europe’s most “tolerant” country, the notion that a nation has the right to her own land and customs has become a legitimate mainstream argument.  Perhaps Theo van Gogh did not die in vain.

On the economic front, the outcome in France and Holland will have beneficial effects, too.  The dirigiste Franco-German consensus, the spirit of which was felt in the constitution and whose adherents still dominate in Brussels, will now retreat before a more vigorous competitive spirit favored by Finland, Ireland, and a few new members in Eastern Europe.  If the CDU’s Angela Merkel unseats Schröder in September, as seems likely, Germany will join them by introducing much-needed tax and labor-law reforms.  More importantly, Germany will cease to underpin the eastern end of the old Paris-Berlin axis.  That would pave the way for center-right reformer Nicolas Sarkozy, Chirac’s archrival, to bring a breath of fresh air into the Elysee Palace in 2007.

There is no rational reason why the European Union has to proceed on the road of ever-tighter political and social integration.  It has removed internal barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and people, and it has rendered violent conflict among its members unimaginable.  That is enough.  Europe’s demographic and cultural survival is in doubt, and that survival is possible only if her historic nations reassert their identity and rediscover their Faith.  The defeated E.U. constitution would have made both of those goals unattainable.  Its consignment to the dust bin of history is good news to all true Europeans and their American cousins.