It is common in liberal and neoconservative circles to argue that the United States should foster democracy around the world to enhance its own security because “democracies don’t fight each other.” At the same time, more traditional conservative critics call for a return to classical republicanism, which they believe will produce, among other things, peace as America retreats from “empire.” Implicit in both arguments is the notion that nations have no objective foreign policy or security interests with which its statesmen, regardless of the constitutional form of their governments, must contend. The ghost of Thomas Paine is evident behind this idea. Paine believed that “war is the system of Government on the old construction. . . . Man is not the enemy of Man.” The “old construction” to which he refers is the military-bureaucratic absolutism that was overthrown in France in 1789 and of which Brian M. Downing now writes.

The Military Revolution and Political Change is a refreshing return to a realistic view of political history. Not that Downing doesn’t have a constitutional preference: he is clearly a partisan of “liberal democracy,” and the theme of his book is how certain states (England, Sweden, Holland) managed to maintain a “democratic trajectory” during the constant wars of the early modern era (the 16th to the 18th centuries). His realism derives from his acceptance of conflict as an inescapable aspect of international relations, as a force that molds governments whose first responsibility is to meet the security needs of their nations. Though he considers those states fortunate that managed to survive and prosper without resorting to autocracy, he does not condemn those that deviated from the liberal path under pressure:

The HohenzoUerns and Bourbons faced an increasingly dangerous international environment. . . . No latter-day Cincinnatus could help here by assuming temporary power, defeating the foreign danger, then retiring to his farm. War became a more or less permanent state of affairs, and remained so for centuries . . . a permanent, extractive state had to be built, and given the circumstances, this necessarily involved the destruction of the estates and the rest of constitutional government. The choice was less between good and evil than between continued independence and loss of sovereignty.

Downing notes that the absolutist or royalist outlook extended beyond crown and court:

Within the nobility, gentry and burghers were numerous adherents of the “national security” position, whose support came from a sober assessment of international realities; survival was indeed imperiled without military and constitutional change.

Downing offers six case studies to make his point: Prussia, France, Poland, England, Sweden, and the Dutch Republic. He sees medieval constitutionalism as the source of later democratic momentum, the main liberal features of the medieval period being decentralized government, property rights, and the rule of law. If these institutions survived the stress of war, then society had a chance to travel the bumpy road to modern democracy.

Downing does not equate democracy with the bourgeoisie. He finds the commercial classes to have been quite adaptable, capable of prospering under constitutionalism and absolutism since both systems valued and promoted economic growth through mercantilist policies. Instead he cites the influence of the “little appreciated virtues” of the medieval past in the development of democratic institutions in early modern Europe.

National economic success played a major role in determining whether a state would have to resort to extraconstitutional measures (mainly new or unauthorized taxes) to meet its security needs. The Military Revolution produced large professional armies reliant upon artillery and extensive supply networks. Wars became protracted and much more expensive. The self-supporting knightly warrior-class had lost on the battlefield (the only debating forum that counted) even before the appearance of firearms, the victims of welldrilled infantry with pikes and longbows that were often city militias. But the Military Revolution quickly outgrew the capacity of city-states to wage war successfully.

“[W]here war needs could be met without mobilizing drastic proportions of national resources . . . conflict with the constitution was much lighter,” Downing argues. The wealth of England and Holland could support great power within a liberal framework. However, after the mercantilist policies of England and France ruined the Dutch commercial empire, the republic lacked the domestic resources to be other than a pawn in the games of others. England was also able to use its financial strength to borrow instead of tax, and to hire mercenaries and subsidize allied armies rather than conscript large numbers of its own citizens. Sweden during its period of enormous strength was able to make up for a weak domestic economy by fighting on the continent, supporting its armies by plunder. Prussia tried this too, but had to squeeze its small domestic base, thus becoming Downing’s model of a successful absolutism.

France had a large internal market, but to mobilize it meant uprooting provincial and noble privileges. The Bourbons fell short of the Hohenzollerns. The French Revolution was triggered not only by a fiscal crisis but by the survival of an independent aristocracy that saw that crisis as a chance to strike and by the continued capacity of the peasants to rebel when the ruling classes were in disarray. Downing argues that it was the “fissures and weaknesses in French military-bureaucratic absolutism” that were its undoing. The revolution returned France to a “democratic trajectory,” but at high cost. “The promise of democracy was followed by chaos, terror and Napoleon,” writes Downing. The sudden mobilization of the masses was destabilizing and created social antagonisms that plague France to this day. Downing believes a “direct institutional continuity of medieval constitutional government” was the better path to democracy.

Yet constitutionalism survived only where it was able to adapt to the needs of the Military Revolution, the Estates accepting the responsibilities of the Crown. Downing’s constitutional states fought just as many wars as did the absolutists. Applying this insight to the present century, two world wars belie the notion that democracies won’t fight. Only governments with popular support have been able to mobilize the resources to wage modern war on a large scale. A world of democratic nations would be capable of unleashing the most devastating wars in history arising from persistent sources of conflict.

Of course liberal political orders can also fail. In 18th-century Poland the gentry were “little more than sacks of potatoes, whose main concern outside their manors became the protection of their liberties and incomes from the crown.” The gentry used constitutionalism to paralyze the central government, with the result that Poland vanished from the map. “The Polish gentry exchanged the privilege of national sovereignty for the right to make money,” Downing concludes, making them “perhaps the most irresponsible elite in all European history.”

In Downing’s ideal modern democratic nation-state, there is a balance of rights and duties. He notes that, “Military service and citizenship were intertwined in antiquity” and that the medieval knight exchanged military services for his liberties and privileges. This exchange was extended to all classes by the Military Revolution: mass armies led to an expanded franchise. Patriotism motivated sacrifice but also sparked social reform on the ground that “a land fit for heroes” should await the returning troops. Minorities gained respect from their valor in combat.

Yet hiring preferences for veterans, V.A. hospitals, and the G.I. Bill are benefits that differ fundamentally from those of the present welfare state, where the shrill demand for rights is accompanied by an equally loud rejection of duties. The same imbalance is evident in granting the vote to “citizens” who have performed no public service, not even the payment of taxes. Democratism has spawned new threats to constitutionalism more dangerous than any king.

 

[The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe, by Brian M. Downing (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 308 pp., $50.00]