Operation Absolute Resolve in the early hours of Jan. 3 showcased military professionalism bolstered by first-class intelligence. It opened with shock-and-awe air strikes that neutralized Venezuela’s air defenses and provided the cover for the Delta Force raid on President Nicolás Maduro’s compound and his prompt transfer to USS Iwo Jima.

The character of the operation defies easy definition. It was not a coup d’état, like the one the Nixon administration helped organize against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. It was not an invasion, like Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 or the invasion of Panama in 1989.

It was neither a classic regime-change operation nor an occupation, like that of Afghanistan in 2001 or in Iraq two years later. It was a truly unprecedented event: a de facto extradition of a head of state, with the objective of effecting major policy changes by his successors.

This was a clear demonstration, on the third day of the second quarter of the 21^st century, that the world has moved beyond those nebulous and inherently dangerous constructs of Team Biden’s “rules-based international order.” That phrase implied the U.S.’s right to impose selective, ad hoc rules while claiming they have universal application. That European globalists fear and mourn the demise of this system is a good sign.

There is only one rule under Trump: raison d’etat, America’s national interest. There is only one guiding principle: protection and promotion of U.S. security and power, which justifies actions that may violate conventional norms. Humanitarian concerns or international law are of little, if any, consequence.

From the realist perspective, this is a welcome development. Three decades’ worth of post-Cold War neoconservative-neoliberal discourse with pretensions of promoting democracy, defending human rights, protecting victims, and preventing genocide, et cetera, as justification for foreign interventions is finally over. Such rationalizations have been hypocritical from the start and have had destabilizing consequences.

Trump’s international order based on the only “rule” that matters—national interest—makes relations with other nations more predictable. Interests and zones of interest can be defined and negotiated. This makes the entire Hobbesian system more rational, calculable, and morally sustainable. Consider how it now seems possible that Russia offered Trump free rein in Venezuela in exchange for U.S. restraint in Ukraine.

Moscow’s reaction to the Jan. 3 raid was muted, even though just over two months earlier, Russia had ratified a strategic partnership agreement with Venezuela signed by Putin and Maduro in May 2025. Putin is a realist and knows that resisting Trump in his backyard would fail—and poison their relations.

The raid itself worked perfectly, probably in some part due to betrayal within Maduro’s inner circle. That much is indicated by the attackers’ apparent detailed knowledge of his schedule, whereabouts, and security protocols. At this time, we do not know whether, or how many and how senior, were the members of his inner circle who switched sides in exchange for immunity from U.S. prosecution, or (for lower ranks) promises of personal safety, relocation, and a cash reward. It is remarkable that more than half of those killed during the raid, 32 to be precise, were Cuban mercenaries who, presumably, were kept out of the loop.

There is a precedent: U.S. officials met with some officers of the Venezuelan army in 2017-2018 to discuss coup plans, but information leaked, and some of the plotters were arrested. This time, the penetration apparently was deeper and, importantly, successful. A fortified stronghold effectively became a trap. It was audacious, yet cost-free to the American side.

The outcome highlights the vulnerability of leaders in times of crisis, no matter how well guarded they may be. As for the Venezuelan military, ostensibly under Maduro’s control, the debacle exposed weaknesses—especially in the multi-layered air defense system—that were either scandalous or else deliberately fostered on the day. Either way, the result was a short-term success for Trump, which leaves political options open.

It seems probable that the Trump administration will work with Maduro’s successor, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, to make Venezuela great again for American oil companies and safe from Chinese and Russian (let alone Cuban) involvement in the country’s political and military affairs. Trump says the U.S. oil industry will be “up and running” in Venezuela within 18 months and that he expects huge investments to pour into the country. A new type of relationship with Maduro’s successor was clear from Trump’s announcement on Jan. 6 that Venezuela would be “turning over” up to 50 million barrels of oil, worth about $2.8 billion, to the United States, to be sold at its market price “to benefit the people of Venezuela and the U.S.”

Trump had never intended the Jan. 3 raid to pave the way for the return of a few dozen prominent “pro-Western, pro-democracy” emigrés who still hope to run the new regime. Putative opposition leader María Corina Machado—who was given last year’s Nobel Peace Prize for no other reason than that of being an anti-Maduro activist—has vowed to return home “as soon as possible.” On Jan. 6, she even declared that she should be Venezuela’s new leader

The White House has repeatedly dismissed suggestions that it install Machado as Maduro’s replacement. Already on Jan. 3, when he declared that he considered himself in charge of Venezuela, Trump said that she “doesn’t have the support within, or the respect” to lead Venezuela. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller confirmed this position on Jan. 5. “It would be absurd and preposterous for us to suddenly fly her into the country and to put her in charge,” he said, adding that Venezuela’s military would not view her as legitimate.

These two statements are significant. Preserving the legitimacy of the post-Maduro regime, ensuring the acquiescence of Venezuela’s military, pretending that Maduro was really the main problem, and promising a new era of good times if the U.S. script is followed, is a splendid formula. It may prove attractive even to the inveterate Chavezista loyalists who are tired of the country’s long decline without fall. For them, Maduro turned out to be a burden in the end, and the U.S. has relieved them of it—although none will say so aloud for the time being.

Far from installing an emigré team in Caracas, the U.S. has been working with Maduro’s right-hand woman and now acting-president, Delcy Rodríguez, who has vowed to cooperate with the U.S. In a statement late on Sunday, Rodríguez said she had “invited the U.S. government to work together on an agenda of cooperation.” Her comments came hours after Trump threatened that she could “pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” if she did not bend to his wishes.

There will be no regime change that could result in determined resistance from about one-third of Venezuela’s population. The Chavezista core are poor Venezuelans, including Amerindians and blacks, who stand to gain little from regime change. Many of them still see the Maduro regime—corrupt and inept as it was—as the only reliable defender of their interests. As it is, they present no real threat to the regime, and Maduro’s successor team will likely continue using the old revolutionary rhetoric while adapting itself to the new reality.

All of this is in sharp contrast to the tragedy that unfolded in Iraq after George W. Bush’s intervention starting in 2003. Maduro’s removal is more clearly conducive to this country’s interests and more realistically defined than Saddam Hussein’s dethroning and death. On balance, using Rodríguez to guide Venezuela to a Trump-friendly posture while repeating the usual Chavezista slogans to placate the regime’s base looks like the wise Machiavellian stroke of a seasoned statesman.

Trump is full of surprises. On balance, this one was not unpleasant.