The Trump administration’s grand strategy achieved some early successes, and its proponents describe it as a shift toward a more selective, interest-based use of American power. Central to this approach has been the codification of the concept of “burden shifting” in both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, which explicitly call for allies in Europe and the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for their own security while the United States concentrates resources on homeland defense and strategic priorities in the Western Hemisphere.

Operationally, the administration paired this strategic retrenchment with reductions of U.S. ground commitments in the Middle East, including withdrawals or drawdowns of forces from Iraq and Syria. At the same time, it demonstrated a preference for limited, high-impact operations rather than prolonged interventions, exemplified by the January 2026 strike and special operations raid in Venezuela that captured President Nicolás Maduro and precipitated negotiations with interim leader Delcy Rodríguez. Supporters, therefore, portray the administration’s record as combining strategic retrenchment with coercive diplomacy: reducing open-ended military deployments while using targeted force and back-channel dialogue to reshape regional political outcomes in ways favorable to U.S. interests.

The conflict in Iran, however, is broader in scope and presents distinct challenges. Moreover, any outside analysis of any recent military action is, to say the very least, difficult. The public cannot be privy to the underlying classified assessments that led the president to make the decision to strike Iran again. Additionally, past conflicts and the lessons learned from them do not apply equally to all current and future conflicts. The ultimate objective of the mission remains unknown to the public and, given the current disposition of the conflict, there may be national security reasons for that. What we do know is that the conflict has resulted in the deaths of seven Americans and that several others were seriously wounded in Iranian retaliatory strikes against regional military installations. On the other hand, the United States has taken out most of the leadership of the Iranian regime and significantly degraded the offensive capabilities of the Iranian military. However, the loss of American lives carries domestic political implications in the United States.

The American people will justify loss of life if they believe that the military objective warranted that risk. As the phases of these operations unfold and the ultimate objective becomes clearer, an assessment of their scope and actions will become easier. What we know now is that from an operational standpoint, the United States has committed forces to sustain an extensive and punitive air campaign. This disposition would seem to be in line with Trump’s prior limited and successful military actions. The current disposition of U.S. forces also lacks a substantial commitment of ground troops to the region, and should that remain the case, it will become clearer to Americans what the Trump administration’s definition of “mission accomplishment” is.

There are around 3 million people in arms and reserves in the Iranian IRGC and Basij militias. Given what we have learned from previous regime change and nation-building operations, it seems unlikely that the Trump administration’s aim is a heavy, ground-based occupation. Attempting to pacify a Persian insurgency seems like a strategy that would include problems similar to those the U.S. has faced elsewhere and might lead into a longer conflict than the American people would accept. Among the potential problems such an occupation would include are the displacement of potentially millions of refugees, leading to millions migrating to Europe and the United States. If ground forces are on the table, the Trump administration will be left with the task of explaining how success can be achieved here that eluded us in Iraq or Afghanistan. There may be a way to achieve that, but it will be a political challenge given the American people’s current sentiments and views on foreign conflicts.

The Trump administration is no doubt weighing and calibrating these challenges. The strategic danger of a war against Iran arises not primarily from battlefield clashes but, potentially, from the outright collapse of the Iranian state. This event could unleash chaos reminiscent of post-2011 Libya or Syria or post-DeBaathification of Iraq in 2007.  These events could spark proxy wars, sectarian bloodshed, and widespread instability that spills into neighbors like Lebanon, Iraq, and possibly Pakistan. Iran is a mountainous country with a majority Persian, conservative, and rural people. It is ripe for insurgency in certain regions of the country. A military victory over the regime in Iran paradoxically risks creating a far more volatile and unpredictable regional security landscape than the pre-conflict status quo.

Of course, it could be the case, again depending on the classified assessments available to the president, that the immediate threat needed to be neutralized and that, having achieved this, the secondary effects are unavoidable problems that will have to be confronted later. It could also be that the Trump administration is fully aware of these dangers and has strategies in place to address them. Iran’s destabilization may not automatically restore balance. Instead, it could intensify power struggles between Israel and Turkey, with the latter maintaining a robust military presence in northern Syria and along its Iranian border, backed by formidable conventional forces ready for swift intervention should renewed civil conflict erupt in Syria, Iraq, or beyond.

The ongoing military operation against Iran began with extensive air, naval, and precision strikes targeting thousands of sites to degrade the country’s missile capabilities, naval forces, and command-and-control infrastructure. But from Iran’s point of view, escalating the conflict and spreading hostilities far and wide appears strategically rational, as it could unify domestic support through a rally-around-the-flag effect, drive up global oil prices, and build anti-war pressure in America and Europe, making a significant further escalation highly probable. Put simply, there appears to be no incentive for Iran to de-escalate. If true, then the war can only spread. What this does not account for is a Venezuela-like deal, some wink-and-a-nod arrangement with someone acceptable to the U.S. who can step into the power vacuum to maintain a quasi-status quo while supporting the same, but a friendlier to U.S. interests, regime.

Despite these challenges, President Trump clearly has the opportunity and track record to shape the conflict’s trajectory following the initial military successes. Several potential avenues are available to guide events toward a stable outcome. The president already hinted that new Iranian leaders should be from within, rather than imposed from abroad. He has also indicated that the administration is willing to work with someone in alignment with the aims of the United States. This instinct reflects an appreciation of the historical difficulties associated with externally engineered regime change in the Middle East, where foreign-backed political orders have often struggled to secure legitimacy or long-term stability. Encouraging an internal political transition could therefore preserve a degree of institutional continuity while avoiding the perception of a new externally installed sovereign authority.

A second avenue would involve calibrated signals of de-escalation, after an initial threshold of success has been established, designed to reassure Tehran that the United States does not seek an indefinite or expansive war. At that point, the repositioning or partial withdrawal of certain naval assets from the immediate theater could serve as a visible indication of restraint while maintaining deterrence capacity. Parallel to this, quiet diplomatic outreach to selected regime officials through backchannel communications may offer a pathway toward negotiations. In this context, the prospect of economic normalization could become a powerful inducement. The possibility that Iran’s economy might recover through the reentry of international trade and investment, including contracts with American companies in reconstruction and infrastructure, could provide influential domestic actors with incentives to support a political settlement.

Establishing a timeline for the resumption of formal dialogue would further reinforce the transition from military confrontation to diplomatic engagement. The Iranian command structure and key nuclear facilities have already suffered significant degradation, altered the strategic balance, and created a window for negotiation. At the same time, the administration is likely mindful of the reputational and humanitarian consequences of a prolonged urban war that could devastate a historic metropolis of Tehran in a manner reminiscent of the destruction seen in Gaza or Grozny.

A descent into a fragmented civil conflict like those endured in Syria or Libya would represent a worst-case outcome not only for Iran but also for regional actors, including the Gulf states, Turkey, and NATO allies. Avoiding such a scenario, while preventing another open-ended American military commitment in the Middle East, remains a central strategic objective.