The English Patriot

Few thinkers have been as unapologetically conservative as Sir Roger Scruton. He converted to a conservative political persuasion during his experience of the 1968 student riots in Paris. He quickly realized that, whatever the protesters were advocating, he was firmly on the opposite side. 

Delving into the fields of aesthetics, music, religion, and law, Scruton’s ultimate intellectual pursuit lay in his desire to conserve rather than destroy. This epiphany led him to the writings of Edmund Burke, whose Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) articulated Scruton’s instinctive skepticism of radical change and his belief that tradition, rather than Enlightenment reform, is the best influence on the quality of citizens. This was complemented by his training as a barrister, which led him to a love of the common law—a tradition he saw as the best answer to counter the ideas of Michel Foucault and other poststructuralists.

Unlike other conservatives, however, Scruton also held a special place in his heart for Hegel and Kant and—contrary to his critics’ claims that he was a Western chauvinist—he openly recognized the contributions of external civilizations, including those of the Islamic traditions, which he believed had something valuable to offer.

Scruton coupled his philosophical pursuits with a vigorous mission in Communist Eastern Europe, in which he supported dissident academics, smuggled banned books, and also delivered underground lectures. He followed those efforts with the creation of the Jan Hus Educational Foundation, based in Prague, and he was arrested and expelled from Czechoslovakia several times during the 1980s for smuggling banned books and giving lectures on subjects prohibited by the Communist government. To this day, Scruton remains an intellectual celebrity in Hungary; there are several “Scruton cafés” in Budapest where his books line the shelves, as well as academic and cultural forums dedicated to discussing his ideas. 

Far removed from being a privileged English aristocrat, as his opponents often depicted him, Roger Scruton was born in 1944 into a working-class family in Lincolnshire, England. In spite of that, his high academic performance earned him a place at a prestigious grammar school and then at Cambridge University, where he pursued an undergraduate degree and then a Ph.D. in philosophy, with an emphasis on aesthetics. 

Following his time in university, Scruton became a professor of aesthetics in 1985, while remaining deeply embedded in discussions of conservative political philosophy as a member of The Conservative Philosophy Group, whose members included John Casey, Enoch Powell, and Alan Clark. Dissatisfied with the liberal trend within academia, Scruton would eventually retreat to a life of writing from his farm in Wiltshire, though he would continue to hold part-time academic posts as he gained prominence as a public intellectual. His bucolic home base complemented his staunch defense of the environment and advocacy for a connection to the land. 

Though he was a beloved intellectual celebrity in Eastern Europe, he never received the same level of adulation back home and was unable to secure an Oxbridge position. He was caricatured by the British left as “the thinking man’s skinhead” and attracted widespread controversy for his role as editor of the conservative magazine The Salisbury Review, in which he published articles exploring issues of ethnicity, culture, and the assimilation of immigrants. Despite all the criticism Scruton has received from the left, it may come as a surprise that some conservatives also have reservations about him—particularly due to the charge that his brand of conservatism contained strains of liberalism. Among these critics are conservative journalist Sebastian Milbank and French philosopher Alain de Benoist. However, such criticisms, whether valid or not, are tempered by Scruton’s patriotism, which was the foundation of his conservative philosophy.

Although Scruton, over time, became more willing to defend a smaller state, capitalism, and certain “classical liberal” institutions, labeling him “liberal” risks overlooking his deeper commitments to the idea of the nation and Western civilization. Moreover, the “liberal institutions” he defended have not only been forgotten and rejected by liberals themselves (as Scruton often pointed out), but are also deeply tied to his defense of a culture rooted specifically in the English-speaking world. 

On countless occasions, Scruton referred to what he called the truth of nationalism, which rested on the belief that for there to be social order in a society of strangers, there must be a common identity to which people can appeal. In a body of citizens marked by public secularism, this takes the form of the nation-state—a concept often rejected by liberals in the name of globalism.

It could be argued that the entirety of Scruton’s work rests on his attempt to craft a political identity based on his philosophy of mankind’s moral and political constitution, which was rooted in his Hegelian emphasis on self-consciousness and freedom. He believed individuals must freely recognize their unchosen obligations, which enable them to live a life of duty and piety. In that sense, man is both free and bound—dependent on the community while also autonomously embracing the connections and moral standards found within it. But what does this community look like? What are the standards or values it holds that characterize man’s moral constitution?

For Scruton, the answer to these questions could only be found in their most complete form in the West, and more precisely, in the English-speaking world. The values and institutions that Scruton believed conservatives ought to preserve—organic democratic institutions, the opportunity to live freely, open and critical discussion, the rule of law, protection of the environment and family—were ultimately represented by his idealized vision of England. This vision was both to restore an England that had been lost as well as to protect one that was still worth preserving. 

Beneath this institutional framework was a system of ethics linked to the English character, which Scruton specifically associated with the notion of the English “gentleman,” a figure embodying kindness, dignity, and restraint. These virtues rested heavily on a sense of fair play, honesty, and mutual trust. It was a character that helped create a distinctive elite bonded through public schools, universities, regiments, and gentlemen’s clubs. These institutions fostered a stable yet socially mobile class whose shared ethics and ties enabled cooperation and resilience—qualities Scruton saw as key to England’s success in empire-building, governance, and economic development.

Tradition and balance were also important features of the English character that were reflected in the harmony between the values of courage and reason, as well as reserve and warmth—cultivating a stable and orderly society that both preserved and defined English identity. The ideal of England acted as a kind of cultural “enchantment,” shaping institutions and daily life by encouraging individuals to strive toward moral strength and social harmony, symbolized in the figure of the English self-made everyman who aspired to be dignified and reliable in times of trouble.

Though many nations have attempted to install these institutions and practices in their own countries, they have continually failed to achieve the same level of stability and success as Great Britain—often because they lacked the appropriate history and culture to support them. Nowhere is this exceptionalism better reflected than in Scruton’s perspective on English common law, which he described as the property of the English people, dating back to the Anglo-Saxons and Celts.

For Scruton, English law was not a set of abstract rules designed by the government or even by consent; instead, it grew from an island culture guided by an unwritten constitution based on customs rather than written laws. These laws emerged from local conflict resolution, not from the imposition of a king or bureaucracy. The English people had long endured disputes, causing the law to become deeply entrenched in their circumstances and consciousness—cultivating both a love of liberty and a natural resistance to tyranny, qualities that Scruton identified as hallmarks of English patriotism. 

Scruton defined common law as “judge-discovered” law, reflecting the principles of order, inheritance, imitation, and learning, and embodying what he called a “narrative of home.” Common law was at the heart of English identity; it was “the voice of a territorial jurisdiction, the law of the land,” and served as a remedy for just grievances. 

Scruton defined common law as “judge-discovered” law, reflecting the principles of order, inheritance, imitation, and learning, and embodying what he called a “narrative of home.” Common law was at the heart of English identity; it was “the voice of a territorial jurisdiction, the law of the land,” and served as a remedy for just grievances. 

While Americans often celebrate their legal system as an innovation, Scruton challenged this view, arguing that the Constitution inherited key foundations from Britain. He saw it as codifying a spirit already present in English common law, and warned that liberal interpretations focused solely on individual freedom risk overlooking the deeper cultural and historical roots of the American legal system.

In addition to his patriotic defense of common law, Scruton described England as a nation with a personality of its own. Personality, he argued, involves language, communication, and a consciousness of self. England was long seen as a land of clubs, teams, and societies—a place saturated with a sense of membership. The country itself was conceived in these terms: as a personal entity with rights and duties greater than those of any individual. This, Scruton suggested, explained the English attachment to the monarchy as a form of government. The king or queen symbolized the personhood of England—its unchanging and vigilant claim on the affection of its people.

For Scruton, England was a moral and spiritual community in which institutions, language, religion, and landscape were all organically integrated as expressions of a shared soul. Historical events like the English demand for scripture in their own tongue during the Reformation signaled both religious change and cultural self-assertion. English became a consecrated language, embodying collective identity. For Scruton, England was a place where the elites felt responsible to share high culture, and the population valued education. 

English identity was expressed through local customs and community festivals that strengthened social bonds and preserved shared practices. Private initiatives like independent schools, universities, hospitals, and charities reflected a culture of voluntary association growing from within communities. Everyday practices—manners, speech, and local habits—were passed down through generations, helping to define social roles and foster dignity. The role of manners was to morally shape the Englishman’s sense of obligation. 

Scruton defined England as a home, held together by a cultural and emotional attachment to a particular place—a place where people belong, express themselves, and find continuity—rather than a strictly legal or administrative apparatus. On a similar note, Scruton’s environmental stance and love for the countryside figured largely in his effort to conserve the nation’s heritage, as reflected in his reverence for the dead, living, and unborn. The English landscape resembled the character and values of its people, reshaped over time in harmony with their shared sense of unity.

England had become politically marginalized and culturally degraded over time, Scruton believed. It had been undermined by external forces such as globalization, as well as by internal betrayals from class elites and capitalist interests. These criticisms of the neoliberal economic model should invalidate any criticism of him as a liberal. He mourned the loss of identity, pride, and connection to the land, which, in his view, had turned England into a hollowed-out “no-man’s land,” disconnected from its past. 

For Scruton, England signified the historical identity and continuing allegiance that unites citizens in the body politic. It is precisely because we could define our membership in territorial terms that we could enjoy the elementary freedoms forming the foundation of political order. In this sense, the sacred institutions and values that conservatives ought to hold dear were manifested most explicitly in Scruton’s love for his own country. 

In fact, Scruton often referred to conservatism as a philosophy of love, whereby we are attached to the people and places that fostered our growth into adulthood. To be conservative is to cherish these things and strive to protect them against decay. For Scruton, patriotism is the foundation of conservatism.