President Obama’s July trip to Moscow was intended to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations but also suggested that there is a continuing tug-of-war in the administration between realists and “democracy builders” regarding Russia policy.

The struggle was publicly kicked off by the March report of a commission headed by former Sen. Gary Hart and Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), which reflected the realpolitik influence of Republican foreign-policy “wise men” such as Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.  The realists favor deemphasizing democracy and human rights in U.S.-Russian relations, giving up a NATO expansion that would include Georgia and Ukraine, and rolling back plans to install missile defenses in Eastern Europe.  In exchange, the realists hope to secure Russian cooperation in pressuring Tehran over its nuclear program, tapping energy supplies in Central Asia that are in the traditional Russian sphere of influence, opening transit routes to Afghanistan for U.S. personnel and supplies, and concluding a new strategic-arms agreement on reducing nuclear stockpiles.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Michael McFaul, the Obama administration’s Russia expert on the National Security Council, are in the democracy-building camp and favor policies not unlike those of the Bush administration, which sorely irritated Moscow and fanned traditional Russian fears of encirclement.  It’s not clear where other administration officials might fall on the spectrum between realism and democracy building, though we have some clues about where the White House is going in the wake of the Moscow summit.

Before his departure, Obama lent support to President Dmitri Medvedev, who is widely viewed as the subordinate of Premier Vladimir Putin in the “tandem” leadership arrangement, though he has been struggling to expand his “liberal” influence in Moscow.  Obama commented that Putin favored “Cold War approaches” and had “one foot in the old ways of doing business and one foot in the new.”  Obama praised Medvedev’s pledges to reform the Russian judicial system and combat corruption but added that he would also meet with Putin, who “still has lots of sway.”  While in Moscow, Obama opined that the Medvedev-Putin tandem was working effectively, a remark interpreted by some as legitimizing the arrangement and Putin’s role, and he began his meeting with Putin by praising his host’s achievements as both president and premier.  Russian sources claimed that Obama promised to stay in touch regularly with Putin, while the two reportedly discussed strategic matters that are officially in Medvedev’s purview.  This approach appeared to reflect the realist view that internal Russian politics are not our concern and that Washington’s bottom line should be to secure Russian cooperation.

Nevertheless, Russian leaders were disappointed by Obama’s decision to meet with human-rights activists and other regime critics, while McFaul told reporters that “We’re not going to reassure or give or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense,” and “we don’t need the Russians, we don’t want to trade with them.”  Nevertheless, many of the Kremlin critics Obama met with were reportedly sorely disappointed when he said that Western rules would not necessarily work in Russia.  One observer noted that a number of activists, some of them veteran dissidents of the Soviet era, had their hopes that Obama would put pressure on Moscow regarding human rights and democracy dashed.  (Some, however, were happy that Obama met with them: Sergey Mitrokhin of the Yabloko party, for instance, told the President that Russian-American joint projects might encourage authorities to behave better in the domestic sphere.)

It was clear that the Russian side was largely pleased with Obama’s stance.  Russian television was positive in its coverage of Obama’s visit.  The United States and Russia signed an “understanding” to continue talks that linked reductions in strategic offensive weapons to defensive systems.  Though the wording was vague, Moscow saw this as an opening to exchange a strategic arms deal for a settlement on missile defense, and Obama was clearly signaling that missile defense could be traded for Russian cooperation on other issues.  (Obama, for instance, told one audience that if Iran did not develop nuclear weapons, missile defense might not be necessary.)  At the same time, Russia agreed to allow transit for U.S. troops and equipment to Afghanistan, something that was high on Obama’s agenda.

What Obama might decide to do in the future, and which camp might win the struggle over Russia policy, remain uncertain, but it appears that the realists have the upper hand for now.  Obama seems to be lending enough rhetorical support to the democracy-building cause to keep that policy option in the mix as a diplomatic tool in talks with Moscow.