“There are two kinds of mind in the world: the Platonic and the Aristotelian,” goes an academic aphorism. To whatever degree this mental division may have been real, the Aristotelians seem to be practically extinct—the essayists in Educating for Virtue must, essentially, be Platonists. The key to that would be this insight from the foreword: “If there is a single thread that runs through these essays, it is the recognition of a universal order that transcends the flux of human life and gives meaning to it.”

This book aside, it is difficult to recall any current criticism which offers a clear-cut alternative, either to idealism or materialism or logical positivism. The options appear to be between otherworldliness and attempts to rationalize reality. Failure to invite Aristotle into this discussion does seem a little willful, perhaps even unprofessional. After all, versions of his organon and other works were basic to education for centuries and still linger in the forms of language. Just because Plato was more palatable to the Arab scholars who were mentors of the early Christians, he was no less a pagan than Aristotle.

Exactly how radical his empiricism was, Aristotle spelled out in Categories. Departing from the idea of universal order (being, or substance), he declared that primary substance is the individual person, place, or thing; for, as he said, without the individuals, species and genus would not exist. Once one has descried this distinction, it is discoverable throughout his works, despite ensuing apocryphal entries such as speculation about a “Prime Mover,” or First Cause.

Adhering to this ontological viewpoint, Aristotle’s appeal was to the responsible free will of the individual rather than a call for obedience to ineffable ideals. His hierarchy of ethical responsibility began with the individual, thence to the family, only then to larger social and political entities.

The Stagirite was able to conceive of happiness in this world, in contrast with so much of the Oriental and other monistic thought. For him, happiness could come to the individual who follows the mean between extremes. For example, the virtue of generosity would lie between prodigality and miserliness. If this poses difficulties for quantification, it does avoid the absurdity of limitless goodness, or the damnation of absolute sinfulness. If we aim to educate for virtue, surely we should take care not to propose impossible goals—with perdition the sole alternative to attaining them.

Which is not to accuse any of these five essayists—Claes G. Ryn, Russell Kirk, Paul Gottfried, Peter J. Stanlis, or Solveig Eggerz—of any such educational crime. Their essays are full of wisdom, both their own and attributed. Most heartening is the title, in turning away from such near-oxymorons as Character Education and Ethical Values. Their dedication to the classical tradition at large and their eloquence in its support are unquestionable and most impressive. Nor, as noted before. Title is their neglect of Aristotle’s originality in any way unusual. It is a pity that the author of so much of the Western tradition of liberty, as well as general science, is shelved in favor of Plato or Karl Marx. Recourse to his works in collation with these authors’ dilemmas could clarify their epistemological and other observations.

La_Dow_Review

[Educating for Virtue, edited by Joseph Baldacchino; Washington, DC: National Humanities Institute]